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SUPERLATIVE QUANTIFIERS AS MODIFIERS OF
META-SPEECH ACTS
ABSTRACT: The superlative quantifiers, at least and at most,
are commonly assumed to have the same truth-conditions as the
comparative quantifiers more than and fewer than. However, as
Geurts & Nouwen (2007) have demonstrated, this is wrong, and
several theories have been proposed to account for them. In this
paper we propose that superlative quantifiers are illocutionary
operators; specifically, they modify meta-speech acts.
Meta speech-acts are operators that do not express a speech
act, but a willingness to make or refrain from making a certain
speech act. The classic example is speech act denegation, e.g. I
don’t promise to come, where the speaker is explicitly refraining
from performing the speech act of promising. What denegations
do is to delimit the future development of conversation, that is,
they delimit future admissible speech acts. Hence we call them
meta-speech acts. They are not moves in a game, but rather com-
mitments to behave in certain ways in the future. We formal-
ize the notion of meta speech acts as commitment development
spaces, which are rooted graphs: The root of the graph describes
the commitment development up to the current point in conver-
sation; the continuations from the root describe the admissible
future directions.
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We define and formalize the meta-speech act GRANT, which
indicates that the speaker, while not necessarily subscribing to a
proposition, refrains from asserting its negation. We propose that
superlative quantifiers are quantifiers over GRANTs. Thus, Mary
petted at least three rabbits means that the minimal number n such
that the speaker GRANTs that Mary petted n rabbits is n = 3. In
other words, the speaker denies that Mary petted two, one, or no
rabbits, but GRANTs that she petted more.
We formalize this interpretation of superlative quantifiers in
terms of commitment development spaces, and show how the
truth conditions that are derived from it are partly entailed and
partly conversationally implicated. We demonstrates how the the-
ory accounts for a wide variety of phenomena regarding the in-
terpretation of superlative quantifiers, their distribution, and the
contexts in which they can be embedded.
1. THE MEANING OF SUPERLATIVE QUANTIFIERS
1.1. Commonly held intuitions
What do superlative quantifiers, like at least and at most, mean? Non-
linguists have a clear intuition—for example, note the following dis-
cussion of at least from a book about computer databases:
One important rule to remember is that there should be at least
(n−1) joins in an n-table query; thus, you need at least two joins
for a three-table query, at least three joins for a query that in-
volves four tables, and so on. The words “at least” are important:
there could be more than (n− 1) joins. . . but if your multitable
query has less than (n − 1) joins, the result will be [bad] (A.
Kriegel and B. M. Trukhnov, SQL Bible, p. 319).
According to this intuition, at least x means x or more, but not less;
at most x means x or less, but not more. In a context in which only
integers are relevant, things are even simpler: at least x means greater
than x − 1, and at most x means fewer than x + 1.
Thus, since it is impossible to pet a non-integer number of rab-
bits, (1-a) would mean (1-b).
(1) a. John petted at least three rabbits.
b. John petted more than two rabbits.1
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Similarly, (2-a) would be equivalent to (2-b).
(2) a. John petted at most three rabbits.
b. John petted fewer than four rabbits.
1.2. Keenan and Stavi (1986)
Until recently, such intuitions were widely shared by linguists as well,
and have been formalized by Keenan & Stavi (1986). According to their
theory, both superlative (at least, at most) and comparative (more than,
fewer than) quantifiers are treated simply as generalized quantifiers,
i.e. relations between sets. Thus, the meaning of (1-a) is simply (3-a),
where R is the set of rabbits, and the meaning of (2-a) is simply (3-b).
(3) a. |R∩λx .pet(j, x)| ≥ 3
b. |R∩λx .pet(j, x)| ≤ 3
Besides being intuitive, this definition has two important advantages.
One advantage is that it gets the truth conditions right: if John pet-
ted two or fewer rabbits, (1-a) is false, and if he petted four or more
rabbits, (2-a) is false.
The second advantage is that these truth conditions are extensional,
which is as it should be. For example, suppose Mary likes rabbits but no
other animal. Then, the extensions of the predicates rabbit and animal
that Mary likes are the same. Note that the truth values of (1-a) and (4)
are the same, indicating that superlative quantifiers are extensional.
(4) John petted at least three animals that Mary likes.
However, Keenan & Stavi’s theory, while getting the truth conditions
right, fails to account for a number of phenomena. In particular, as
Geurts & Nouwen (2007) point out, the meanings of superlative quan-
tifiers differ from those of comparative quantifiers (more/fewer than)
in subtle ways.
One of the observations of Geurts & Nouwen is that the distribution
of comparative quantifiers is more restricted than that of superlative















, John petted three rabbits.
Additionally, superlative quantifiers, but not comparative ones, may
combine with quantifiers, proper names, and specific indefinites:

















two rabbits, namely Bugs
Bunny and Peter.
There are, however, cases where comparative quantifiers are accept-
able, and it is superlative quantifiers that are odd. Suppose John pet-
ted exactly three rabbits, and we know this. Based on this fact, we
would be justified in uttering (1-b); however, it would be quite strange
to utter (1-a) or (2-a).2
There are differences between superlative and comparative quanti-
fiers not just in distribution, but also in interpretation: the former lack
some readings that the latter have. For example, (7-a) is ambiguous: it
can mean either that it is permissible for you to have fewer than three
martinis (say, because you don’t like martinis), or that you may not
have more than two martinis. In contrast, (7-b) is not ambiguous, and
only receives the second reading.
(7) a. You may have fewer than three martinis.
b. You may have at most two martinis.
1.3. Geurts and Nouwen (2007)
In order to account for these phenomena, Geurts & Nouwen (2007)
argue against the commonly held intuition, and propose that compar-
ative and superlative quantifiers have different interpretations.
Following Krifka (1999a), they propose that comparative quanti-
fiers are focus sensitive NP modifiers. Roughly, (1-b) means that there
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is a property that is higher or equal on the relevant scale than the prop-
erty of petting two rabbits, and this property applies to John.3
Formally, the meaning Geurts & Nouwen propose for more than α
is:
(8) λx .∃β(β > α∧ β(x))
The relevant scale is affected by focus, which explains the difference
between (9-a) and (9-b).
(9) a. John petted more than [two]F rabbits.
b. John petted more than [two rabbits]F.
Sentence (9-a), with focus on two, means that John petted a number of
rabbits, and this number is greater than two; while (9-b), with focus on
two rabbits, is compatible with John having petted exactly two rabbits,
provided that he petted additional animals.
Sentences (9-a) and (9-b) are evaluated with respect to different
scales; and yet other scales account for examples such as the following:
(10) a. I will be more than happy to send you the necessary forms.
b. The telephone service here is less than satisfactory.
Sentence (10-a) is presumably evaluated with respect to a scale in-
volving properties such as being reluctant, indifferent, happy and ec-
static; (10-b) presumably involves properties such as being terrible,
bad, satisfactory, good, and excellent.
Importantly, Geurts & Nouwen restrict α and β in (8) to denote
only first-order properties, i.e. expressions of type 〈e, t〉. The proper-
ties happy and satisfactory are clearly first-order. The property of being
a group of two rabbits is also first-order in their system, since they treat
groups as individuals. But propositions are not first-order properties,
which is why comparative quantifiers cannot combine with them, and
the unacceptability of the sentences in (5) is thereby explained. Sim-
ilarly, quantifiers, names, and specific indefinites also do not denote
first-order properties, which is why the sentences in (6) are bad.
Regarding superlative quantifiers, Geurts & Nouwen propose that
they are epistemic operators. Specifically, the meanings of (1-a) and (2-a)
can be roughly paraphrased as (11-a) and (11-b), respectively.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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(11) a. It is epistemically necessary that John petted three rab-
bits, and it is epistemically possible that he petted more.
b. It is epistemically possible that John petted three rabbits
but it is epistemically impossible that he petted more.
Geurts & Nouwen demonstrate how their approach solves some of the
problems with Keenan & Stavi’s theory. In particular, they can explain
why (2-a) would be odd if it is known that John petted exactly three
rabbits: according to Geurts & Nouwen’s theory, (2-a) entails that it is
epistemically possible that John petted three rabbits. But in this case
it is not only epistemically possible, but, in fact, epistemically necessary
that John petted three rabbits, so the speaker makes a weaker state-
ment than the one she can and ought to make. In other words, saying
that it is epistemically possible that John petted three rabbits impli-
cates that it is not epistemically necessary; but this implicature is not
satisfied in a situation where it is known that John petted three rabbits.
According to Geurts & Nouwen (1-a) is not merely odd, but actually
false: this is because it entails that it is epistemically possible that John
may have petted more than three rabbits; but if it is known that he
petted exactly three, this entailment is plainly false.
Crucially, superlative quantifiers are not restricted to combine only
with first-order properties: hence, their distribution is less restricted
than that of comparative quantifiers, and the facts exemplified by the
sentences in (5) and (6) are thereby explained.
The missing reading of (7-b) is explained by the analysis of superla-
tive quantifiers as epistemic modals: in general, deontic modals cannot
take scope over epistemic ones.
Thus, Geurts & Nouwen’s theory successfully accounts for a number
of puzzling phenomena. However, they make these gains at a consider-
able cost. One problem is that the superlative morphology of superla-
tive quantifiers is ignored: it is not reflected in the analysis. There is
nothing in the logical form proposed by Geurts & Nouwen for (1-a)
that indicates that three is the least number of rabbits that John petted.
Moreover, Geurts & Nouwen lose the two major advantages of
Keenan & Stavi’s theory: correct truth conditions, and extensionality.
Basing the truth conditions of superlative quantifiers on epistemic
modality makes them subjective, depending on epistemic states, which
leads to incorrect predictions. Suppose John petted exactly four rabbits
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in the actual world; then (1-a) would be true and (2-a) would be false,
regardless of any belief worlds.
One may try to save Geurts & Nouwen’s theory by treating the epis-
temic modals as objective. Lyons (1977) draws a distinction between
subjective and objective senses of epistemic modals. Thus, (12-a) is sub-
jective, depending on the epistemic state of the speaker; but (12-b)
is “objective”, in the sense that it depends on the epistemic states of
a large number of people, who are collectively the authority on the
subject.
(12) a. Has anybody heard the news? I want to know who won
the match. It might have been Mark.
b. There might have been life on Mars at some point in the
past.
However, treating Geurts & Nouwen’s epistemic modals as objective
would not help. Suppose John committed exactly four traffic viola-
tions, but nobody knows this, not even the police (who are the author-
ity on the subject), and not even John himself. Then, it would still be
true that he committed at least three traffic violations, and false that
he committed at most three traffic violations, and these truth values
depend only on what actually happened, not on anybody’s beliefs.
The analysis of superlative quantifiers as epistemic modals also
leads to the incorrect prediction that they are intensional. However,
as we have seen above, superlative modifiers are extensional. Consider
again the case where Mary likes rabbits, but no other animal. But this
fact may not be known; hence, it may be epistemically necessary for
John to pet three rabbits, without it being epistemically necessary for
him to pet three of the animals that Mary likes. Hence, it is predicted
that (1-a) may have a different truth value from (4), repeated below:
(13) John petted at least three animals that Mary likes.
But this prediction is wrong.










However, nothing in Geurts & Nouwen’s theory predicts this behavior.
Geurts et al. (2010) present the results of experiments that are
claimed to support this theory; but some of the results actually are
in conflict with it. Recall that, according to this theory, there is a fun-
damental difference between at least and at most: if John petted ex-
actly three rabbits and the speaker knows this, (1-a) would be false,
whereas (2-a) would be true but infelicitous. As a consequence, (1-a)
is predicted to be ruled out in this situation; however, citing Noveck
(2001) and their own unpublished study, Geurts et al. conclude that
true but infelicitous sentences such as (2-a) ought to receive a mixed
response, i.e. be acceptable about half the time.
Geurts et al.’s prediction, however, is not borne out. They asked
subjects to judge whether (15-b) and (15-c) follow from (15-a).
(15) a. Wilma had three beers.
b. Wilma had at least three beers.
c. Wilma had at most three beers.
The results were that both (15-b) and (15-c) are accepted about half
the time.
Geurts et al. are aware of this difficulty, and they attempt to ex-
plain it by hypothesizing that people who accept (15-b) do so because
they interpret (15-a) as saying that Wilma had three beers or more. As
support for this claim, they demonstrate that when (15-a) is replaced
with (16), the acceptance of the inference to (15-b) is reduced signifi-
cantly.
(16) Wilma had exactly three beers.
However, this argument is not convincing, for two reasons. One is that
the acceptance rate is about 20%, still significantly higher than the pre-
dicted 0%. The second reason is that there is a much simpler explana-
tion for why exactly reduces the acceptance of the inference: plausibly,
the word exactly itself acts as a superlative quantifier. Evidence for
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Therefore, an utterance of (16) introduces a set of alternative sen-
tences involving other superlative quantifiers— (15-b) and (15-c)—
and implicates that these alternatives are false.
In this paper, we propose that superlative quantifiers are illocution-
ary operators. To make this view explicit, we need to look more closely
at speech acts.
2. MODELING SPEECH ACTS AND META-SPEECH ACTS
2.1. Commitment developments
We understand speech acts as changing commitments of the interlocu-
tors. A conversation will consist of a sequence of such commitment
changes, which we will call a commitment development. We model
commitment developments as follows. Let us assume that c is the cur-
rent commitment, a commitment development which incorporates the
changes that were enacted up to this point. Let us assume that A(s,a)
is a speech act by speaker s to addressee a, which results in the obliga-
tions obl(A(s,a)) (where it is irrelevant, we will suppress speaker and
addressee arguments, and just write A). Then the enactment of A(s,a)
at the commitment development c can be modelled as follows:
(18) c + A = {c, obl(A)}
As a result, we have a set consisting of the input commitment devel-
opment c and the new commitments, which is the output commitment
development. Note that c represents the development so far, and is
therefore a member of the output, as the output “memorizes” the way
that led to this state.
We represent the initial commitment development by the empty set,
indicating that nothing has happened so far. The added commitment
or commitments are not themselves sets but commitments specified in
some representation language. For example (where Φ is a proposition
and Φ a set of propositions):
(19)
c + ASSERT(s,a)(Φ) = {c, s guarantees a that Φ is true}
c + QUEST(s,a)(Φ) = {c, s obliges a to assert those




For illustration, consider a case in which a commitment development c
undergoes two subsequent changes:
(20) c + A + B = {c, obl(A)} + B = {{c, obl(A)}, obl(B)}
The resulting structure is a tree. For example, with the empty context
as a root and three speech acts A, B, C, and ruling out repeated enact-
ments of the same speech acts, we have the commitment developments
for the first two steps as depicted on the left-hand side of the following
diagram (where we write {c, A} for {c, obl(A)}, for short).
(21)
Game tree of commitment developments Tree of commitment states
This is a so-called game tree that shows the possible courses that a
game might take. We write c < c’ iff c’ is a commitment continuation
that succeeds c. This notion can be defined recursively as follows:
(22) a. c < {c, commitments}
b. if c < c’ and c’ < c”, then c < c”
Update of commitment developments is order sensitive, that is, c + A
+ B is different from c + B + A. Sometimes we do not care about the
order in which the commitments have been introduced. We can get rid
of the order information by recursive union, ⋒:
(23) a. ⋒{;, o1, ... on} = {o1, ... on}, where o1, ... on: obliga-
tions.
b. ⋒{c, o1, ... on} = {⋒c, o1, ... on}
For example,
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(24) ⋒{{;, obl(A)}, obl(B)} = {obl(A), obl(B)}
We call such unordered sets of commitments commitment states. Com-
mitment states lead to a more compact representation of language
games than commitment developments. For example, the game tree
on the left-hand side of (21) results in the representation specified on
the right-hand side, using commitment states.
As in other games, not every transition is a possible move. One
important rule is that the update of commitment developments comes
with a requirement that new commitments do not contradict existing
ones. For example, if a speaker has asserted Φ, this speaker cannot
assert ¬Φ later:
(25) c+ ASSERT(s, a)(Φ) = {c + s guarantees a that Φ is true},
provided that
[s guarantees a that ¬Φ is true] /∈ ⋒ c
This is certainly not the case in everyday conversation; people do change
their minds. But here we restrict ourselves to the basic case of mono-
tonic update.
The notion of updates of commitment developments allows for a
straightforward treatment of conjunction of speech acts. As a matter
of fact, there are two types of conjunction: dynamic conjunction ‘;’ and
static conjunction ‘&’:
(26) a. c + [A ; B] = c + A + B
b. c + [A & B] = [c + A] ∪ [c + B] = {c, obl(A), obl(B)}
These two notions of speech act conjunction coincide if we model
conversation with commitment states instead of commitment devel-
opments.
(27) ⋒ [c + [A ; B]] = ⋒ [c + [A & B]] = ⋒ [c + A] ∪ ⋒ [c + B]
Krifka (1999b, 2001) has argued that speech act conjunction is needed
to deal with quantification into questions, as in the following example,
which has a reading under which the universal quantifier appears to
scope out of the speech act (cf. Karttunen 1977):
(28) a. How many rabbits did every child pet?
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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b. ∀x[child(x)→ How many rabbits did x pet?]
c. = ∀x[child(x)→What is the number n such that x petted
n rabbits?]
The formula illustrates the intended analysis only but cannot be taken
literally, as its consequent is a question, not an expression that eval-
uates to a truth value. But as universal quantifiers are generalized
conjunctions, we can assume that the whole expression denotes a con-
joined speech act:
(29)
c + [How many rabbits did every child pet?]
= c + & x∈child QUEST(How many rabbits did x pet)
= c + [QUEST(How many rabbits did John pet) &
QUEST(How many rabbits did Mary pet) &
QUEST(How many rabbits did Sam pet) . . . ]
This adds to the commitment development c the commitments that
come with the indicated questions; that is, if accepted, the addressee
has to give answers to these questions.
The analysis of quantification into questions (and other speech acts)
works because it involves universal quantification, which can be re-
duced to conjunction. Other quantifiers, like most, do not allow for
this reading:
(30) a. How many rabbits did most children pet?
b. = What is the number n such that most children petted n
rabbits?
c. 6= For most children x: How many rabbits did x pet?
This is because most cannot be reduced to conjunction, but requires
disjunction for its definition, and disjunction is not defined for speech
acts in general. To be sure, we do find disjoined questions, but they are
not interpreted as expressing an obligation on the addressee that either
the first or the second question should be answered. Depending on
intonation, they get other interpretations, e.g. as alternative questions.
For example, the following question, with rising accent on rabbit and
falling accent on chameleon, is an alternative question that presupposes
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that either Mary petted a rabbit or that John poked at a chameleon, and
the addressee should specify the proposition that is true.5
(31) Did Mary pet a rabbit, or did John poke at a chameleon?
If a commitment development could be updated with a disjunction
of two speech acts, the result would be an ambiguous commitment
development. Such ambiguities would quickly multiply if additional
disjunctive speech acts were uttered. This is a processing constraint
for speech acts. In the next section, we will define the notion of com-
mitment development spaces, which exclude speech act disjunction in
principle, except in special cases where they do not lead to ambiguous
commitment developments.
2.2. Commitment development spaces: Denegation
The notion of a commitment development has to be broadened to deal
with so-called speech act denegation, as in the following example (cf.
Searle 1969):
(32) I don’t promise to come.
According to Hare (1970), the speaker is “explicitly refraining from
performing the speech act in question”. This cannot be expressed as an
update of a commitment development, as a regular speech act. Also,
notice that denegations cannot be marked with hereby:
(33) ∗I hereby don’t promise to come.
What denegations do is to delimit the future development of con-
versation, that is, they delimit future admissible speech acts. Hence we
call them meta-speech acts. They are not moves in a game, but rather
commitments to act in certain ways in the future. This requires a more
general setup for the modelling of conversational games.
In this more general setup, we introduce the notion of commitment
(development) spaces as a rooted set of commitment developments.
Formally, a set C of commitment developments is a commitment space
if the following holds:
(34) There is a c ∈ C such that for all c’ ∈ C: c ≤ c’
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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We call the minimal commitment development the root of the com-
mitment space, and write
p
C. For any sentence in discourse, there
is a commitment space that defines the current commitments of the
discourse participants, which are modelled by a commitment space C.
The root of C describes the commitment development up to the current
point in conversation; the continuations from the root in C describe the
admissible future directions that the commitment might take.
We can think of the commitment space as representing the rules of
the conversational game. There are general rules, like the one men-
tioned above that contradictory commitments should be avoided. But
there are also rules that are introduced during the conversation itself.
Speech act denegation is such a rule; with I don’t promise to come, the
speaker excludes the move I promise to come, at least for the time being
The enactment of a regular speech act relative to a commitment
space, that is, the update of a commitment space C by a regular speech
act A, can now be defined as the subset of commitment developments
that we get by updating the root of the commitment space:
(35) C + A = {c ∈ C | pC + A ≤ c}
The update of a commitment space C with a speech act A results in the
set of commitment developments containing the root of C updated with
the speech act A, and all commitment developments of C that continue
this updated root. Notice that the definition of update of a commitment
space C by a speech act A requires that the set C is a rooted set of
commitment developments, as it refers to the root
p
C, and will lead to
another rooted set of commitment developments, the new root beingp
C + A. In the following diagram, the root of the output commitment
state is rendered black, and the other common ground developments
of the output state are rendered gray.
(36)
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The denegation of a speech act also consists in a change of the input
commitment space, namely in explicitly refraining from making the
speech act that is denegated. We can understand this in one of two
ways: Either locally, the speaker refrains from making the speech act
at the current point, or globally, the speaker refrains from making the
speech act now or at future states. We assume here that denegation
has a local character. This is because we find (37-a) to be consistent,
in contrast with (37-b).
(37) a. I don’t promise to come to your party, but I might promise
to later, when I’ve had a look in my calendar.
b. # I promise to come to your party, but I might say that I
won’t come after I’ve had a look in my calendar.
But we note that speech act denegations are made with the idea that a
future enactment of the denegated speech is dependent on some condi-
tion, like a change of the state of the world or the available information,
as suggested in (37-a) by when I’ve had a look in my calender.
The weak denegation of a speech act A, for which we will write ∼A,
then can be stated as follows:
(38) C + ∼A = C + A
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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This is the complement of the commitment space C updated with A.
The result is a rooted commitment state, with the same root as the
input state C. Denegation just prunes the tree of admissible develop-
ments:
(39)
We have the complement rule: ∼∼A = A, as for every C it holds that
C + A= C + A.
Dynamic and static conjunction of two speech acts can be modelled
as follows:
(40) a. C + [A ; B] = {c∈C | pC + [A ; B] ≤ c} = C + A + B
b. C + [A & B] = {c∈C | pC + [A & B] ≤ c}
As C is a set (of commitment developments), we now might want to
define the notion of a disjunction of speech acts, as set union. But
this does not result in a proper commitment space, as the resulting set
typically is not rooted.
C + [A∨ B] = [C + A]∪ [C + B]
(41)
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If speech acts are transitions from commitment spaces to commitment
spaces, then it follows that disjunctions are not defined for speech
acts, as the output would not be a commitment state, but just an un-
rooted set of commitment developments. However, it turns out that
the denegation of a disjunction of commitment spaces is well defined,
as it results in a a proper, rooted commitment space:
C+ ∼ [A∨ B] = [C + [A∨ B]]
= [[C + A]∪ [C + B]]
= [C + A]∩ [C + B]
= [C+ ∼ A]∩ [C+ ∼ B]
(42)
This application of de Morgan on the level of speech acts predicts the
following equivalence:
(43) a. I don’t promise to marry you or swear to stay with you
b. ⇔ I don’t promise to marry you and I don’t swear to stay
with you.6
The operation of intersection in the last line is a kind of Boolean con-
junction: it identifies the commitment space that results from C when
both the update ∼A and the update ∼B are satisfied. But notice that
with simple speech acts A, B, intersection of C + A with C + B typi-
cally results in the empty set, as C + A = {c∈C | {pC, obl(A)} ≤ c}
and C + B = {c∈C | {pC, obl(B)} ≤ c}, which are non-overlapping
sets if obl(A) 6= obl(B). However, notice that C + [A & B] = {c∈C |
{
p
C, obl(A), obl(B)} ≤ c} describes the update of C to a commitment
state where the obligations of both A and B are satisfied. Hence we can
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define a “Boolean” conjunction of commitment states as follows:
(44) a. If A & B is defined: C + [A∧ B] = C + [A & B]
b. else, C + [A∧ B] = [C + A] ∩ [C + B]
The case of (44-b), where A & B is undefined, was illustrated above.
This definition has the consequence that de Morgan’s rule sometimes
holds. For the case of (42), the part (44-b) applies: We have∼ [A∨B] =
[∼ A∧ ∼ B], as ∼ A & ∼ B is not defined if A, B are simple speech acts.
A case in which (44-a) applies is illustrated below.
(45)
The main use of denegation in this paper is to define the meta-speech
act of a GRANT.7 A GRANT indicates a willingness to go along with a
possible assertion of a proposition by the opponent.
Hence, a GRANT is a denegation to assert the negation of that
proposition:
(46) GRANT(Φ) := ∼ ASSERT(¬Φ)
The result of GRANTing a proposition Φ is illustrated in the following
diagram. Notice that GRANTs, as denegations, do not change the root.
The GRANT includes, but does not enforce, the assertion of Φ.
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(47)
We have the following equivalence, familiar from the modal logic equiv-
alences Φ = ¬◊¬Φ:
(48) ASSERT(Φ) =∼ GRANT(¬Φ)
The following diagram illustrates GRANT(¬Φ); notice that the com-
plement is ASSERT(Φ).
(49)
3. THE PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS OF SUPERLATIVE QUANTIFIERS
3.1. Modelling superlative operators
We are now in a position to model at least and at most as speech-act
related operators, or rather, as operations that help to express meta-
speech acts. Take the following example:
(50) Mary petted at most three rabbits.
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Intuitively, this says that the maximal number n such that the speaker
GRANTs that Mary petted n rabbits is n = 3.
(51) max n : GRANT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)|) = 3
This explains the superlative morphology of at most. In our current
setup, (51) cannot be interpreted directly. But notice that we can in-
terpret it as saying that for all numbers n with n > 3, the speaker does





∼ GRANT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)| = n)





∼ GRANT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)| = 4) ∧





With at most, the speaker does not make an assertion but rather ex-
cludes assertions—here, the assertions that Mary petted 4 or more rab-






ASSERT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)| 6= n)
= C + &
n>3
ASSERT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)| 6= n)
The speaker excludes that Mary petted four or more rabbits, but leaves
it open whether she petted three, two, one, or no rabbit at all.
We now consider the case of at least, with the following example:
(55) Mary petted at least three rabbits.
This says that the minimal number n such that the speaker GRANTs
that Mary petted n rabbits is n = 3:
(56) min n : GRANT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)|) = 3
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This translates into the denegation of GRANTs that Mary petted n rab-




∼ GRANT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)| = n)





∼ GRANT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)| = 2) ∧
∼ GRANT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)| = 1) ∧




With at least, the speaker excludes assertions that Mary petted 2, 1, or





ASSERT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)| 6= n)
= C + &
n<3
ASSERT(|rabbit ∩ λx.pet(m, x)| 6= n)
The speaker excludes that the number of rabbits Mary petted is smaller
than 3.
3.2. Truth conditions
Representing superlative quantifiers as modifiers of meta-speech acts
raises an immediate question. Recall that we hailed as one of the ad-
vantages of Keenan & Stavi (1986) the fact that they get the truth
conditions right, and one of our complaints against Geurts & Nouwen
(2007) was the fact that they don’t. But if, as we claim, the meaning
of (1-a) is not a proposition, how can it get any truth conditions, let
alone the correct ones?
We have argued that (1-a) means that the minimal n s.t. the speaker
GRANTs that John petted exactly n rabbits is three. As we have seen
in (59), from this it follows that the speaker makes the following three
assertions:
(60) a. John did not pet exactly two rabbits.
b. John did not pet exactly one rabbit.
c. John did not pet exactly zero rabbits.
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This interpretation of (1-a) accounts straightforwardly for cases when
it is false. Suppose, for example, that John petted exactly two rabbits.
Then the content of the assertion (60-a) is false, which accounts for the
falsity of (1-a).
Things are more interesting when the sentence is true. Suppose
John petted exactly four rabbits—then (1-a) ought to be true. Indeed,
the content of all the assertions in (60) would be true. Is this sufficient
to account for the truth of (1-a)?
Not quite. If the minimal n s.t. the speaker GRANTs that John pet-
ted exactly n rabbits is three, it follows that the speaker makes the
assertions in (60), but it does not follow that these are all the asser-
tions that she makes. The speaker could, for example, also assert (61).
(61) John did not pet exactly four rabbits.
In this case, it would still be the case that the minimal n s.t. the speaker
GRANTs that John petted exactly n rabbits is three, yet (1-a) would be
false, rather than true.
In order to account for the truth of (1-a), then, we need to rule
out assertions like (61). We cannot do so on logical grounds, since an
assertion of (61) would be perfectly consistent with the interpretation
of (1-a) we are proposing. However, we can rule it out on pragmatic
grounds, specifically by conversational implicature.
By using a superlative quantifier, the speaker took the trouble to
indicate that she accepts the commitments of all the assertions in (60);
if she also wanted to commit to the claim that John did not pet exactly
n rabbits for other values of n, the maxim of Quantity dictates that she
should have indicated that as well. From the fact that she didn’t, we
can conclude, by a straightforward implicature, that she is not commit-
ted to such an assertion. Since the content of all the assertions that
the speaker is committed to is true, it follows that (1-a) is true if John
petted exactly four rabbits, which is the result we want.
Note that, according to our view, what (1-a) says about values of
n< 3 is an entailment, while what it says about n≥ 3 is an implicature.
This asymmetry between the falsity of the sentence (which follows
semantically) and its truth (which follows pragmatically) captures the
intuition (which also underlies Geurts & Nouwen (2007)) that when
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one says (1-a) one doesn’t know what the number of rabbits that John
petted is; but one does know what that number is not.
The proposal that the truth of sentences with superlative quanti-
fiers comes from implicature has received some experimental support.
Hacohen et al. (2011b; 2011a) have presented subjects with pictures
and sentences with superlative quantifiers, and asked subjects to indi-
cate whether the sentences accurately describe the pictures. Reaction
times for (correct) true judgments turned out to be significantly longer
than reaction time for (correct) false judgments. In contrast, no sig-
nificant difference was found between true and false judgments with
comparative quantifiers. On the assumption that the computation of
implicature takes additional time Bott & Noveck (2004), our theory
provides a natural explanation of these results, which would be myste-
rious under Geurts & Nouwen’s account.
The fact that the truth of superlative quantifiers follows pragmati-
cally can also explain another difference between them and compara-
tive quantifiers. Suppose John petted over a thousand rabbits. Then
an utterance of (1-b), reproduced below, would clearly be rather odd.
(62) John petted more than two rabbits.
However, we believe it is unquestionable that (62) is true in the situa-
tion described. It is usually odd to talk about more than n individuals
satisfying a certain property, when the number of individuals actually
satisfying the property is substantially higher than n. However, in the
right context, such a statement may be acceptable. Here are a few
examples, taken from the Web:
(63) a. If one person throws one piece of rubbish on the ground
per day then that person throws 365 pieces of rubbish in
one year, but Koh Tao has more than one person, in fact
320,000 people.8
b. In some instances, your e-mail message may be seen by
more than one person. . . in fact, it may be forwarded to
the entire mailing list.9
c. I was experiencing this strange feeling with more than
one person; in fact, with lots of people of both sexes.10
Note that all these sentences would become odd if we replace the com-
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parative more than one person with at least two people. This corresponds
to the fact that it is much harder to judge a sentence with a superlative
quantifier as true in such a situation.
This is easily explained if the truth comes from an implicature. A
speaker uttering (1-a) is taken to assert that John did not pet exactly 2,
1, or 0 rabbits. As the speaker leaves it open whether John did not pet
exactly 3, 4, 5. . . rabbits, the implicature arises that the speaker con-
siders it possible that John did pet exactly 3, 4, 5. . . rabbits. But this
implicature may get weaker the higher the numbers get, because there
might be additional reasons why the speaker might consider it impos-
sible that John petted, say, 1000 rabbits—and then, in fact, would be
ready to assert that John did not pet 1000 rabbits.
The same sort of asymmetry can be seen, perhaps even more clearly,
when we consider other speech acts besides assertion. Take requests,
for example:
(64) Give me at least three cookies.
The conditions under which this request is not satisfied are clear: if
the hearer gives the speaker fewer than three cookies—two, one, or no
cookies at all. But the conditions under which the request is satisfied
are less clear: not any number n≥ 2 of cookies will equally satisfy the
speaker. Four cookies may be better than three, but one thousand may
be too many.
3.3. Non-numerical scales
Superlative quantifiers do not always apply to numerical scales. Con-
sider the following attested examples, where the if not continuation
makes it clear what the relevant scale is:
(65) a. Rehabilitation without invasive procedures is at least com-
parable if not superior to more invasive and costly proce-
dures.11
b. This is at least misleading, if not wrong.12
c. The agent who bills such expenses is at least unethical, if
not criminal.13
d. [That] prices continued to rise after the announcement. . . is
at least possible if not certain in at least some parts of
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Russia.14
e. The “Gab Drag” is at least plausible, if not necessary, from
a dramatic perspective.15
f. This is at least confusing, if not conflicting.16
This interpretation is attested even when a numeral is involved. As
Horn (1972) and Kadmon (1987) have shown, (1-a) and (2-a) have
readings that can respectively be roughly paraphrased as:
(66) a. John petted exactly three rabbits, and maybe he petted
more animals.
b. Maybe John petted exactly three rabbits, but he petted no
other animal.
In these examples, the superlative quantifier applies to entailment
(Horn) scales: being superior entails being comparable, being wrong
entails being misleading, being criminal entails being unethical, etc.
We formalize this phenomenon by generalizing ‘≥’ beyond numer-
ical comparisons: if P and Q are propositions, and P is higher on the
relevant Horn scale than Q, we write P ≥Q.
This phenomenon is a generalization of our previous treatment of
superlative quantifiers over numerals. To see this, note that one of the
equivalent formulations of (1-a) is (67).
(67) ∀n(GRANT(|rabbit∩λx .pet(j, x)| = n)→ n≥ 3)
Now, any proposition of the form |rabbit∩λx .pet(j, x)| = n, for n≥ 3,
entails |rabbit∩λx .pet(j, x)| ≥ 3. Hence, we can rewrite (67) as (68),
where it is assumed that context restricts P to range only over state-
ments about the number of rabbits that John petted.17
(68) ∀P(GRANT(P)→ P ≥ ˆ|rabbit ∩λx .pet(j, x)| ≥ 3)
Similarly, (2-a) can be formulated as (69-a), which is equivalent to (69-b).
(69) a. ∀n(GRANT(|rabbit∩λx .pet(j, x)|= n)→ n≤ 3)
b. ∀P(GRANT(P)→ P ≥ ˆ|rabbit∩λx .pet(j, x)| ≤ 3)
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However, we will continue to use the conceptually simple numerical
comparison, whenever the scale is numerical.
4. ACCOUNTING FOR THE DATA
Our proposed account can explain the facts motivating Geurts &
Nouwen’s approach, and also the facts that constitute challenges to
their theory.
For the purposes of this paper, we accept Geurts & Nouwen’s ac-
count of comparative quantifiers: in particular, that they are restricted
to combine with first-order properties only. We therefore accept their
account of the distributive facts concerning such quantifiers.
Regarding superlative quantifiers, we have seen that our theory
provides truth conditions that are extensional and intuitively correct,
something that Geurts & Nouwen fail to do. We have also seen that
our approach, unlike theirs, does justice to the superlative morphology
of superlative quantifiers, by paraphrasing (1-a) and (2-a) as (70-a)
and (70-b) respectively.
(70) a. The minimal (“least large”) number n s.t. the speaker
GRANTs that John petted exactly n rabbits is 3.
b. The maximal (“most large”) number n s.t. the speaker
GRANTs that John petted exactly n rabbits is 3.
Recall that Geurts & Nouwen point out that (1-a) and (2-a) would
be odd if we knew that John petted exactly three rabbits, but for dif-
ferent reasons: the former is false, whereas the latter is literally true
but odd. Under the proposed approach, the reason for both is the
same: if the speaker knows that John petted exactly three rabbits, then
she ought to assert this, and not GRANT that John petted any other
number of rabbits. However, both (1-a) and (2-a) implicate that the
speaker GRANTs, but does not assert, that John petted exactly three
rabbits, and that the speaker GRANTs this statement for other values
of n (n > 3 for (1-a), n < 3 for (2-a)). Since this is an implicature,
and not an entailment, both (1-a) and (2-a) are infelicitous rather than
false, and the experimental results reported by Geurts et al. (2010) are
explained.18
We can also explain why at most, but not at least, licenses NPIs. Fol-
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lowing Kadmon & Landman (1993) and Krifka (1991; 1995), an NPI
introduces alternatives, and implicates that all the stronger alterna-
tives than the one asserted are false. For example, anything introduces
alternative properties, but denotes the most general property: thing.
Usually, all the other properties are stronger, hence are implicated to
be false. But this is a contradiction: how can something be a thing,
without having any more specific property? Therefore, the use of any
is unacceptable in most environments. However, in a downward en-
tailing context, the other alternatives are weaker: for example, under
negation, not being a thing is stronger than not having any more spe-
cific property. Therefore, the alternatives are not implicated to be false,
and any is licensed.
Now consider (14), repeated below:
(71) a. At least three people have ever been in this cave (last
century).
b. At most three people have ever been in this cave (last
century).
The NPI ever introduces alternative sets of times within the reference
time—last century—and denotes the most general of them—the en-
tire century. The clause inside the scope of the superlative quantifier
implicates that all the stronger alternatives are false.
In order to explain why the NPI is licensed in (71-b), we need to
show that (72-a) is stronger than (72-b)
(72) a. At most 3 people have been in this cave at some time or
other.
b. At most 3 people have been in this cave last year.
Since we propose that superlative quantifiers are illocutionary opera-
tors, we need to define the notion of relative strength for speech acts.
A natural definition is the following:
(73) A1 is as strong as or stronger than A2 iff for all commitment
spaces C , ⋒(C + A1)⊆ ⋒(C + A2)
In words, A1 is stronger than A2 iff every commitment that A1 creates
is also a commitment that A2 creates, but not vice versa.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Superlative Quantifiers 28
In order to show that (72-a) is stronger than (72-b), one more piece
of the puzzle is needed. A speaker who asserts φ is committed to the
truth of φ; but what if φ entails ψ? Is the speaker also committed to
the truth of ψ? It is arguable whether, in general, this is a reasonable
requirement, since often it is very hard to figure out the entailments of
a proposition. However, we certainly can require this if the entailment
from φ to ψ is, in some sense that we will not try to make precise,
clear and obvious. In this case, indeed, the consistency requirement on
commitment spaces requires that a speaker who asserts φ is committed
to the truth of ψ.
The update with (72-a) is (74-a), and the update with (72-b) is (74-b).
(74) a. C +
∧
n>3ASSERT(¬ ‘n people have been in this cave at
some time or other’)
b. C +
∧
n>3ASSERT(¬ ‘n people have been in this cave last
year’)
Now, for any n, it is clear and obvious that ¬ ‘n people have been in this
cave at some time or other’ entails ¬ ‘n people have been in this cave
last year’; therefore, if a commitment state contains the commitments
of the former, it ought, by consistency, also to contain the commitments
of the latter. We can therefore conclude that the commitment space
in (74-a) is a subset of the commitment space in (74-b), i.e. the former
is stronger than the latter, which explains the licensing of NPIs with at
most.
In order to explain why (71-a) is bad, we need only point out
that (75-a) is not stronger than (75-b).
(75) a. At least 3 people have been in this cave at some time or
other.
b. At least 3 people have been in this cave last year.
Intuitively, if the speaker minimally GRANTs that 3 people have been
in this cave last year, then by a simple logical inference, the speaker
must be prepared to minimally GRANT that 3 people have been in this
cave at some time or other.
In order to account for the missing readings of superlative quanti-
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fiers, as exemplified by (7-b), we need to discuss more thoroughly the
phenomenon of embedded superlative quantifiers.
5. EMBEDDING
5.1. Constraints on embedding
Because Keenan & Stavi (1986) claim that superlative quantifiers are
just generalized quantifiers, their theory predicts that they should be
freely embeddable. This prediction is not borne out, as pointed out by












of the guests danced with at least/most
three of the waitresses.
b. ?Betty didn’t have at least/most three martinis.
When superlative quantifiers are replaced in these examples by epis-
temic modals, they claim, the judgments are the same. Geurts & Nouwen
do not explain why epistemic modals behave in this way, but consider
this fact evidence for their theory, according to which superlative quan-
tifiers are epistemic modals.
We would be hesitant to draw such a conclusion based on only
two examples. But even if it is true that superlative quantifiers are
embedded in the same environments in which epistemic modals are
(which is an empirical question), all that such a fact would demon-
strate is that there is something similar in the meanings of superlative
quantifiers and epistemic modals. In fact, it is often claimed that at
least some epistemic modals are speech act modifiers themselves (see
Cohen (2010) for a recent argument to that effect). If, as we believe,
superlative quantifiers are also speech act modifiers, this would explain
the similarity between them.
What is the prediction of our theory regarding embeddings of su-
perlative quantifiers? At first sight, it might appear that we predict that
embedding is impossible, since superlative quantifiers are speech act
modifiers. But this is not quite right: as we have seen in section 2 (see
also Krifka (to appear)), although there are contexts where speech acts
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operators cannot be embedded, there are also contexts where they can.
We therefore ought to investigate the contexts under which superla-
tive quantifiers can be embedded, and those where they can’t, and see
whether this distribution can be accounted for under the assumption
that they are illocutionary operators. Let us look at a few examples.
5.2. Downward entailing environments
5.2.1. Quantifiers
On the basis of (76-a), Geurts & Nouwen claim that superlative quanti-
fiers are good in the scope of strong quantifiers, but bad in the scope of
weak ones. But the use of the partitive Q of the guests actually prefers
the strong reading of the quantifiers, so this conclusion is dubious.
Note that the only quantifier that is really bad in (76-a) is none,
whose scope is a downward entailing environment; in order to explain
the unacceptability of the sentence, we need to look more closely at
the behavior of superlative quantifiers in such environments.
5.2.2. Superlative quantifiers are often bad. . .
As example (76-b) indicates, superlative quantifiers are not good in the
scope of negation. Nilsen (2007) observes that superlative quantifiers
are generally bad in downward entailing contexts:
(77) a. ??John hardly ate at least three apples.
b. ??Policemen rarely carry at least two guns.
c. ??This won’t take at least 50 minutes.
Compare this with the acceptability of comparative quantifiers in the
same environments:
(78) a. John hardly ate more than three apples.
b. Policemen rarely carry more than two guns.
c. This won’t take more than 45 minutes.
As we have seen, Geurts & Nouwen’s explanation, namely that superla-
tive quantifiers behave like epistemic modals, is not satisfactory.
Alternative approaches are taken by Büring (2007) and Cummins
& Katsos (2010), who can be seen as proposing more sophisticated ver-
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sions of Keenan & Stavi’s (1986) ideas. While there are important dif-
ferences between the two theories, both propose, in essence, that (1-a)
is interpreted as (79).
(79) John petted three or more rabbits.
Büring and Cummins & Katsos demonstrate how the use of the disjunc-
tion can explain many of the puzzling facts about superlative quanti-
fiers discussed above.
However, these theories, just like Keenan & Stavi (1986), predict
that superlative quantifiers can be freely embeddable; in particular,
they predict that superlative quantifiers can occur in the scope of down-
ward entailing contexts. Indeed, although at least three is bad in down-
ward entailing contexts, three or more is perfectly good, as can be seen
by the following attested examples:
(80) a. [A]gainst Pittsburgh, five players had two receptions, and
nobody had three or more.19
b. Nobody wants three or more inboxes and calendars in the
government20
c. Nobody wants to spend three days or more in hospital if
they could be safely back home within 24 hours21
d. Five of you managed to guess two numbers correctly, but
alas nobody got three or more right22
None of the previous theories, then, successfully accounts for the in-
ability of superlative quantifiers to be under the scope of downward
entailing operators. But what, then, is the explanation of this fact?
To answer this question, let us consider the meaning of the affirma-
tive counterpart to (76-b):
(81) Betty had at least three martinis.
According to the theory proposed here, (81) means that the speaker
asserts, for all values of n < 3, that it is false that Betty had exactly n
martinis.
Therefore, if Betty had fewer than three martinis, (81) is false.
If Betty had n martinis, for some n ≥ 3, the sentence is true, but
this truth follows pragmatically, by way of conversational implicature,
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rather than semantically. The speaker could have also denied that Betty
had n martinis, and this would have been a stronger statement than the
one she actually chose to make. But the fact that the speaker chose not
to make that statement, implicates that the speaker actually GRANTs,
for all n ≥ 323, that Betty had n martinis. Since we assume that the
speaker is committed to the disjunction of all her contextually relevant
GRANTs, it follows that she is committed to the disjunction, one of
whose elements is n, and (81) is therefore true.
Thus, the falsity of (81) follows semantically, but its truth requires a
scalar implicature. So (81) does not have standard truth conditions: to
get a proposition from it, we need a scalar implicature. The implicature
gets us a strengthened reading, which does have truth conditions.
It is well established that scalar implicatures do not survive when
triggered in downward entailing contexts. For example, implicature
usually causes disjunction to receive an exclusive interpretation. But
in the antecedent of a conditional, disjunction is usually interpreted
inclusively, because the implicature doesn’t apply:
(82) If you drink or smoke, you will become ill
Sentence (82) cannot mean that one who drinks and smokes will es-
cape illness!
In fact, Chierchia (2004) observes that scalar implicature cannot
be embedded in any context that licenses any, and explains this fact as
follows. Normally, the reading derived by scalar implicature is stronger
than the literal meaning. For example, exclusive disjunction is stronger
than inclusive disjunction. However, in contexts that license any, the
statement derived by the implicature is actually weaker than the orig-
inal statement, and this is not allowed, by what he calls “the Strength
Condition”. Thus, (83), in which disjunction is exclusive, is actually
weaker than (82), and this is why this interpretation is not generated.
(83) If you drink or smoke but not both, you will become ill.
What about superlative quantifiers? Since their complete truth condi-
tions are generated by scalar implicature, it follows that it should not
be possible to embed them in a downward entailing context.
Let us, for concreteness, see how this comes about in the case of
negation. The formalization of the affirmative (81) is:
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(84) C+∼ GRANT(|martinis∩λx .have(b, x)|= 2))∧
∼ GRANT(|martinis∩λx .have(b, x)|= 1))∧
∼ GRANT(|martinis∩λx .have(b, x)|= 0))
If we treat (76-b) as the denegation of (81), and apply de Morgan and
the complement rule, its formalization would be:
(85) C+GRANT(|martinis∩λx .have(b, x)|= 2))∨
GRANT(|martinis∩λx .have(b, x)|= 1))∨
GRANT(|martinis∩λx .have(b, x)|= 0))
What are the derived truth conditions? As before, they ought to be
determined by what the speaker GRANTs. But we have, in fact, very
little information about this. We know that the speaker GRANTs at
least one statement with n ≤ 2, but we don’t know which. And the
speaker may GRANT other statements, with various values of n—this
is not precluded by (85). Thus, we can say very little about the truth
conditions of (76-b).
Suppose Betty had exactly two martinis; if the speaker GRANTs the
corresponding statement, her utterance would be true; but we don’t
know this. Now suppose Betty had exactly four martinis. Then we
know that one of the statements the speaker GRANTs is false; but
perhaps she also GRANTs that Betty had exactly four martinis, which
would be true. In short, unlike the case of non-negated superlative
quantifiers, truth conditions are not defined for negated ones, either
semantically or pragmatically. This is why negated superlative quanti-
fiers are bad.
We can now explain why (7-b), repeated below, does not have the
reading where at most is under the scope of may.
(86) You may have at most two martinis.
The scope of may licenses any, as demonstrated by (87).
(87) You may pick any card.
This is explained by the fact the purpose of permissions is to lift restric-
tions for the addressee: a permission to pick a card with unspecified
characteristics is stronger than a permission to pick, say, the Ace of
Spades, since it gives the addressee more options.
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Chierchia (2004) points out that, indeed, implicatures do not sur-
vive under may: (88) does not mean that you are not allowed to both
drink and smoke.
(88) You may drink or smoke.
Since implicature is crucial to the derivation of the truth conditions of
sentences involving superlative quantifiers, the reading of (86) where
it is under the scope of may is uninterpretable, and this is why it is
not attested. If at most takes scope over may, there is, of course, no
problem.
If superlative quantifiers are bad in downward entailing environ-
ments, it follows that that they are positive polarity items. Indeed, they
behave similarly to PPIs. For example, it is well known that PPIs are
typically not good with positive questions, but require negative ques-


















he have TONS of money?24
The same behavior is observed when a superlative quantifier is embed-






John have at least three martinis?
Of course, in an echoing or contrast context, a superlative quantifier
can be acceptable in a positive question. Suppose that at a meeting
of Alcoholics Anonymous, it was decided that anyone who drank no
more than three martinis would be honored by a public mention of the
person’s name. We know John to be a very heavy drinker, so when we
hear his name announced, we can certainly ask, incredulously:
(91) Did John have at most three martinis?
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5.2.3. . . . but sometimes good
The facts concerning embeddings of superlative quantifiers in down-
ward entailing environments are not so simple, however. There are
cases when superlative quantifiers are actually perfectly good in such
environments, as exemplified by the following minimal pair, adapted
from Nilsen (2007):
(92) a. Click away at the Finalize your order button: You will get
a discount if you click it at least twice.
b. ?? Don’t click incessantly on the Finalize your order but-
ton: You will generate multiple orders if you click it at
least twice.
The difference in acceptability between (92-a) and (92-b) is strik-
ing: yet they appear to make very similar statements, and in both, the
superlative quantifier is in a downward entailing environment. The
only difference appears to be that in (92-a), the consequences of click-
ing multiple times on the button are “good”, whereas in (92-b), the
consequences are “bad”.
What counts as “good” or “bad” consequences is, of course, not easy
to define. Yet, it is generally fairly clear intuitively what the speaker
judges to be good or bad. We are not claiming that it is a strict rule
that superlative quantifiers never occur in the antecedents of condition-
als with “bad” consequents, but the tendency is quite strong. Indeed,
a corpus study Shapira (2010) reveals that only 5.7% of condition-
als with at least in the antecedent have “bad” consequents. Shapira
found that, in contrast, 45.05% of conditionals with more than in the
antecedent have “bad” consequents.
Nilsen (2007) attempts to account for this phenomenon by stipu-
lating that at least n presupposes that n is the least useful of the al-
ternatives. But apart from being stipulative, this is incorrect: in (1-a),
there is no reasonable sense in which three rabbits is the least “useful”
among the alternatives.
How, then, can we account for these facts?
To answer this question, let us consider the antecedent of the con-
ditional as an asserted full sentence:
(93) You will click at least twice.
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According to our theory, (93) means that the speaker asserts that the
hearer will not click exactly n times for n= 0 and n= 1.
As we have seen, if the hearer clicks exactly zero or one times, (93)
is false. If the hearer clicks n ≥ 2 times, (93) is true, but its truth fol-
lows pragmatically, by way of conversational implicature, rather than
semantically: by not explicitly excluding higher values of n, the speaker
implicates that she is only committed to the assertions that n 6= 0
and 6= 1; since the contents of both these assertions are satisfied for
n≥ 2, (93) is true.
Thus the falsity of (93) follows semantically, but its truth requires
an implicature. So (93) does not have standard truth conditions: to
get a proposition from it, we need a scalar implicature. Since scalar
implicature cannot be embedded in downward entailing contexts, su-
perlative quantifiers are predicted to be bad in such environments.
Yet, as we have seen, this prediction is not borne out. While (92-b)
is indeed bad, (92-a) is fine. How can we explain this fact?
If there were an alternative way to interpret (93), one that would
provide us with truth conditions without implicature, it would be pos-
sible to embed the superlative quantifier in a downward entailing en-
vironment. In other words, we need to get the strengthened meaning
of (93), namely that you click twice or more, without implicature.
It so happens that at least does have such an alternative interpre-
tation. Kay (1992) identifies three senses of at least, one of which is
particularly relevant here.25
This is the interpretation Kay calls the evaluative sense of at least,
which can be exemplified by the following sentence:
(94) At least this hotel is centrally located.
Several points should be made regarding this sense.
First, note that (94) presupposes that being centrally located is a
desirable property for hotels. If this presupposition is not satisfied, as
in (95), the sentence is odd.
(95) # At least this hotel is noisy.
Kay describes the evaluative use of at least when applied to a root
clause. When at least is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional,
the felicity of the evaluative reading requires that the property be a
Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models
37 Ariel Cohen & Manfred Krifka
“positive” one; but sometimes we can only tell this from the conse-
quent. For example, there is nothing inherently good or bad about
being on Walnut St.; the felicity of the following sentences depends
on the “goodness” of the consequent: taking the hotel is “good”, going
elsewhere is “bad”.
(96) a. If this hotel is at least on Walnut St., I will take it.
b. #If this hotel is at least on Walnut St., I will go elsewhere.
Second, it follows from (94) that the hotel is centrally located, and that
being centrally located is the minimal requirement for the speaker’s
goals (presumably, staying at the hotel), though the hotel may possess
additional good qualities.
Third, Kay points out that the property of being centrally located is
not the maximally positive one, and there are some positive properties
that the hotel fails to have. In our view this last point is implicated,
rather than entailed by (94), because it can be canceled:
(97) You should consider this hotel. At least it’s centrally located,
and possibly it’s the perfect hotel for you.
Compare this with the impossibility of canceling the entailment that
being centrally located is the minimal requirement:
(98) #This hotel is at least centrally located, but it would be ok even
if it were far away.
Fourth, the evaluative reading, unlike the reading of at least we
discussed up to now, ought not to be analyzed as a speech act modifier.
One piece of evidence for this is the fact that (94) is perfectly felicitous
even when the speaker knows all the properties of this hotel, whereas,
as pointed out above, (1-a) would be odd if the speaker knew exactly
how many rabbits John petted.
Kay discusses briefly the syntax of the evaluative at least, and ar-
gues that it functions as an unfocused parenthetical: “Initial, final, and
preverbal position are favorite places for parenthetical insertions in En-
glish, though they are not the only such positions available” (p. 318).
We assume that, perhaps depending on intonation and context, the
evaluative reading of at least is, in principle, always available.
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We suggest that embedding a sentence such (93) in the scope of a
conditional is another way to force it to receive an evaluative interpre-
tation, since the illocutionary reading is not available. The resulting
meaning is as follows:
1. Presupposition: Clicking (exactly) twice is good
2. Implicature: You will click less than some maximally good limit
3. Entailment: Two is the minimal number of clicks you will per-
form.
When (93) is embedded in a downward entailing environment, as
in (92-a), the presupposition is satisfied, since getting a discount is a
good thing. As discussed above, the implicature disappears, because of
the Strength Condition. We are left with the entailment, which gives us
the desired truth conditions: if twice is the minimal number of clicks
you will perform, you will get a discount.
In contrast, we cannot embed (93) in (92-b), because, in this case,
the presupposition is not satisfied: clicking twice is not good, because
it will generate multiple orders.
There is further evidence that the superlative quantifiers in these
examples really get the evaluative reading and not the illocutionary
interpretation such quantifiers usually receive. Recall that one of the
characteristics of superlative quantifiers, as opposed to comparative
ones, is that they are not ambiguous under a deontic modal. So, (99)
can only mean that the hearer is not allowed to have more than one
drink, not that it’s ok if the hearer has no more than one.
(99) You may have at most one drink
However, this reading is available with superlative quantifiers in
the antecedents of conditionals with “good” consequents. For example,
suppose Mary is invited to a party. She is a very moderate drinker, so
she decides that if she is allowed to have no more than one drink, she
will come. Mary can then say:
(100) If I may have at most one drink, I will come to the party.
Note that, in this case, the superlative quantifier is in the scope of may,
which it is not supposed to be able to do under the illocutionary inter-
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pretation. This is an indication that the superlative quantifier receives
a different reading. Since the consequent is “good”, this different read-
ing is plausibly the evaluative interpretation.
In contrast, note what happens if the consequent is “bad.” Suppose
John is also invited to the party. Unlike Mary, John believes that a party
is not good unless there is plenty of alcohol, and demands that guests
not be allowed to have fewer than two drinks. Yet, he cannot say:
(101) #If guests may have at most one drink, I will not come to the
party.
The reason is that the consequent is “bad”, so the superlative quantifier
cannot be in the antecedent of the quantifier,
Kay (1992) does not discuss the possibility of an evaluative reading
for the other superlative quantifier, at most, but it seems to have an
evaluative interpretation too:
(102) This is a bad hotel; at most, it’s centrally located.
Just as with at least, being centrally located is still presupposed to
be a good thing. The difference is in the entailment: being centrally
located is less than the minimal requirement, so that the sentence en-
tails that nothing better than being centrally located can be said about
the hotel.
Now consider (103).
(103) You will click at most twice
If (103) receives the evaluative reading, the result is this:
1. Presupposition: Clicking (exactly) twice is good
2. Implicature: you will click more than some maximally bad limit
3. Entailment: the maximal number of clicks you will perform is
two.
When (103) is embedded as in (104-a), the presupposition is sat-
isfied, the implicature disappears, and the entailment provides us with
the correct truth conditions: if two is the maximal number of clicks you
perform, you will get a discount. This is impossible in (104-b), because
the presupposition is not satisfied.
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(104) a. If you click at most twice, you will get a discount.
b. # If you click at most twice, the transaction will be can-
celed.
The behavior of both superlative quantifiers in the antecedent of a con-
ditional is thereby explained.
Interestingly, strong NPIs behave in a way that is exactly the oppo-
site of that of superlative quantifiers—they are fine if the consequent is
“bad”, but ruled out if the consequent is “good” Lakoff (1969):26





spinach I will give you $10





candy I will whip you.
Regine Eckardt (pc) shows that the same is true of strong NPIs:






We have already seen that superlative quantifiers are PPIs; it is
tempting to speculate that our account can be extended to other PPIs,
i.e. that they have an evaluative interpretation too. Possibly, NPIs also
have something like an evaluative interpretation, except that they pre-
suppose that an undesirable, rather than a desirable property. How-
ever, we will not explore these intriguing possibilities further here.
Nilsen (2007) notes that superlative quantifiers in the restrictor of a
universal behave the same way as in the antecedent of a conditional—
they are acceptable if the consequent is “good”, but are ruled out if it
is “bad”:






get a thank you postcard.






marks is a fool.
The explanation we propose is the same as we have proposed for
conditionals. The restrictor of a universal is a downward entailing con-
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text, in which conversational implicatures are canceled: the quantifi-
cation domain of (108) includes individuals who drink and smoke.
(108) Everybody who drinks or smokes will become ill.
Therefore, only the evaluative sense of superlative quantifiers is al-
lowed, and it requires that the nuclear scope will be perceived to be
positive. Since getting a thank you postcard is a good thing, (107-a) is
fine; but since being a fool is bad, (107-b) is odd.
If the consequent of the conditional is a deontic modal, there is
a clear difference in acceptability, depending on the type of modal.
Superlative quantifiers are fine if the consequent is a permission, but
bad if the consequent is an obligation:





30 minutes late you must re-
port immediately to the Office of the Registrar, Room
2122, South Building Nilsen (2007).
b. If you arrive at least 30 minutes early, you may come to
my office for a coffee.





$50 in your pocket, you ought
to go to the bank to get more.
b. If you make at most $500 a month, you may apply for a
stipend.
Again, the explanation appears to be related to the good/bad dis-
tinction. In general, obligations are “bad,” but permissions are “good.”
Thus, the presupposition of the evaluative sense of superlative quanti-
fiers is satisfied with obligations, but violated with permissions.
The same phenomenon obtains regarding superlative quantifiers in
the restrictor of quantifiers: obligations are considered “bad,” whereas
permissions are “good”:
(111) a. Campaign finance laws make it a campaign’s respon-










b. Everybody who contributed at least $200 may vote in
the Primaries.







Epistemic modals present an interesting problem. Geurts & Nouwen
note that superlative quantifiers may be embedded in the antecedent
of a conditional, if the consequent contains an epistemic modal, either
of necessity or possibility:
(112) If Betty had at least three martinis, she must/may have been
drunk.
They admit, however, that their theory cannot handle this example.
Similar facts obtain for superlative quantifiers in the restrictor of a
quantifier:
(113) Everybody who had at least three martinis, must/may have
been drunk.
As we have seen, the antecedent of a conditional and the restrictor
of a universal are downward entailing contexts, in which scalar im-
plicature does not survive; since an implicature is necessary to derive
truth conditions, the antecedent does not have derived truth condi-
tions. One may wonder whether the superlative quantifier receives an
evaluative interpretation, but this is implausible. Epistemic modals are
neutral with respect to “good” or “bad”: there is nothing inherently
“good” or “bad” about the speaker believing something to a high or
low degree. Hence, the presupposition of the evaluative interpretation
is not satisfied.
A possible solution to this behavior of superlative quantifiers may
be provided by the type of conditionals that Sweetser (1996) calls
meta-metaphorical conditionals. They are exemplified by the following:
(114) a. If the Île de la cité is the heart of Paris, the Seine is the
aorta.
b. If life is a candle-flame, then people are the moths burned
on the flame.
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These conditionals relate two metaphors that are literally false (the Île
de la cité is not a heart, the Seine is not an aorta, etc.). However, people
may still refuse to assert their falsity, but accept them as metaphors,
and be willing to assert them. The intended meaning appears to be
that if the speaker is willing to assert the antecedent, she would also
be willing to assert the consequent.
We propose that conditionals containing a superlative quantifier in
the antecedent and an epistemic modal in the consequent are inter-
preted in a similar way: the conditional does not relate two proposi-
tions, but rather two speech acts.27 It is the main claim of this pa-
per that superlative quantifiers are interpreted as (meta) speech acts;
hence the antecedent of (112), containing a superlative quantifier, is a
speech act: the speaker denies that Betty had two martinis, denies that
Betty had one martini, and denies that Betty had zero martinis. Fol-
lowing the theory of epistemic modals as illocutionary operators (Co-
hen (2010); cf. section 5.1 above), the consequent, too, is a speech act:
it is an assertion that Betty was drunk, with a high (for must) or low
(for may) degree of strength. What the conditional says is that if the
speaker is willing to make the first speech act, then she will be willing
to make the second speech act too.
In a similar way, if the speaker utters (113), she is saying that for
every individual x s.t. she is willing to deny that x had n martinis if
n < 3, she is willing to assert with a high/low degree of belief that x
was drunk.
5.2.4. Back to negation
If the superlative quantifier in the antecedent of a conditional is
negated, the judgments are reversed: if the consequent is “good” the
sentence is bad, whereas if the consequent is “bad”, the sentence is
good:
(115) a. If you don’t click at least twice, the system won’t respond
to your request.
b. #If you don’t click at least twice, you will get a discount.
The reason is simple. Under the evaluative interpretation, clicking at
least twice requires a “good” consequence; hence not clicking at least
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twice requires a bad consequence.
Indeed, we receive the same behavior with unambiguously evalua-
tive uses of at least:
(116) a. If this hotel isn’t at least on Walnut St., I will go else-
where.
b. #If this hotel isn’t at least on Walnut St., I will take it.
In fact, this behavior obtains in general when the the superlative
quantifier in the antecedent of a conditional is in the scope of a down-
ward entailing operator, as can be seen by the following attested ex-
amples:
(117) a. If nobody reveals a hand (that is, nobody has at least 3 of
a kind) everyone still in may make another exchange.28
b. Ace-High, A five-card hand with an ace but no pair; if
nobody has at least a pair, it’s the winning hand (simi-
larly “King-high”, “Queen-high” etc.).29
We have seen that since permissions are “good” and obligations are
“bad”, superlative quantifiers are fine with the former but odd with the
latter. When the superlative quantifiers are negated, these judgments
are reversed: they are bad with permissions, but good with obligations.
(118) a. If Betty didn’t have at least 3 martinis, she should be
barred from our club.
b. #If Betty didn’t have at least 3 martinis, she can drive.
c. Everybody who didn’t drink at least 3 martinis should be
barred from our club.
d. #Everybody who didn’t drink at least 3 martinis can drive.
e. If you don’t have at least $50, you should go to the bank
to get more.
f. #If you don’t make at least $500 a month, you may apply
for a stipend.
The judgments are reversed with epistemic modals too, but for a
different reason. We have seen that epistemic modals are fine with su-
perlative quantifiers, because they naturally express a connection be-
tween two speech acts. However, if the superlative quantifier in the
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antecedent is negated, the result is bad:
(119) # If Betty didn’t have at least three martinis, she must/may
have been sober.
The reason is that (119), unlike (112) and (113), does not convey any
natural connection between two speech acts.
Recall the discussion of (76-b), repeated below:
(120) ?Betty didn’t have at least three martinis.
As we have seen above, a negated superlative quantifier is a rather
unclear statement. The antecedent of the conditional, (120), only says
that the speaker GRANTs the statement that Betty had n martinis for
some n < 3; but there may be other values of n < 3 for which she
does not GRANT this, while there may be values of n≥ 3 for which she
does. Hence, there is no clear connection between this statement and
the speaker’s level of confidence that Betty was sober.
As we have seen, (112) and (113) cannot be helped by the evalu-
ative reading, since there is nothing inherently “good” or “bad” about
epistemic modals. In fact, one may take this point even further. Why
can’t (120), on its own, receive the evaluative interpretation, and, con-
sequently, be acceptable?
It turns out that, in general, the evaluative interpretation is bad in
the scope of negation, regardless of whether the predicated property is
“good” or “bad”:
(121) a. ??This hotel isn’t at least centrally located.
b. ??This hotel isn’t at least far away.
We are not sure what the reason for this behavior is.
5.3. Propositional attitudes
Propositional attitudes can, of course, allow for recursive embedding:
(122) Annabelle believes that Matthew suspects that Darcy wants
to kill Guy.
Can speech acts also be embedded under propositional attitudes?
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They ought to be, if speech acts are sufficiently similar to proposi-
tional attitudes, i.e. if speaking is sufficiently similar to thinking (Krifka
to appear). According to some, this is indeed the case: the only differ-
ence is that the speaker uses a natural language, whereas the thinker
uses a language of thought (Fodor 1975).
We will not settle the language of thought issue here, nor do we
need to: superlative quantifiers are meta-speech acts, which express
willingness or unwillingness to make certain speech acts. Thus, meta-
speech acts are clearly similar to propositional attitudes, and hence are
predicted to be embeddable under them.
This prediction is, indeed, borne out:
(123) Mary thinks that John petted at least three rabbits.
Note that (123) is, in fact, ambiguous, between two readings that can
be paraphrased as (124-a) and (124-b).
(124) a. Mary thinks: “John petted n rabbits,” for some number
n, and the speaker says that n is at least three.
b. Mary thinks: “John petted at least three rabbits.”
The two readings are distinct: only (124-b) implicates that Mary is
not sure how many rabbits John petted. How can this ambiguity be
accounted for?
Note that (125), with a comparative quantifier, is similarly ambigu-
ous.
(125) Mary thinks that John petted more than two rabbits.
This ambiguity can straightforwardly be accounted for as involving
the relative scopes of the attitude verb and the comparative quanti-
fier.30 This suggests that the ambiguity of (123) is also a scope ambi-
guity.
Specifically, in our system, (124-a) means that the minimal n s.t. the
speaker GRANTs that Mary thinks that John petted exactly n rabbits is
3. Note that under this reading, the propositional attitude is inside
the scope of the illocutionary operator. But (124-b), which is, in fact,
much more prominent, means that the minimal n s.t. Mary GRANTs
that John petted exactly n rabbits is 3. Now, the illocutionary operator
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is inside the scope of the propositional attitude operator.
Recall that a speech act has (at least) two arguments, in addition
to the propositional content: the speaker and addressee. We propose
that the variable s, indicating the speaker, is a shiftable indexical in the
sense of Schlenker (2002). According to Schlenker, propositional at-
titudes quantify not over possible worlds, but over contexts. Contexts
determine a possible world, but also a speaker and addressee. Non-
shiftable indexicals, such as the first person pronoun in English, can
only refer to the speaker in the context of utterance. But shiftable in-
dexicals, such as the first person pronoun in Amharic, may refer to
the speaker of the embedded context. This is why (126) can only
mean that John says that the speaker is a hero, while its counterpart in
Amharic can mean that John says that John is a hero.
(126) John says that I am a hero.
Although first person pronouns do not shift in English, speaker-
oriented expressions do seem to shift. For example, (127-a) means
that the speaker considers the fact that it stopped raining lucky; but
when embedded in (127-b), the sentence means that Mary considers it
lucky.
(127) a. Luckily it stopped raining.
b. Mary thought that luckily it had stopped raining.31
Treating the speaker variable of a speech act as a shiftable indexical,
and ignoring the addressee, we can formulate32 the respective logical
forms of readings (124-a) and (124-b) as follows (where c0 is the con-
text of utterance):
(128) a. c0 : ∀n(ASSERT(speaker(c0),addressee(c0))
(thinkc1(m, (|rabbits∩λx .pet(j, x)|= n)))→ n≥ 3)
b. c0 : thinkc1(m,∀n(ASSERT(speaker(c1),addressee(c1))
(|rabbits∩λx .pet(j, x)|= n)→ n≥ 3))
Since c1 is the context of Mary’s thought, both “speaker” and “ad-
dressee” of c1 are Mary herself, hence (128-b) means that Mary thinks





Sentence (129) is ambiguous between (130-a) and (130-b).
(129) John needs at least three martinis.
(130) a. The minimal n s.t. the speaker GRANTs that John needs
exactly n martins is n= 3.
b. The minimal number n of martinis that satisfies John’s
needs is n= 3.
According to (130-a), John needs some number of martinis, and
the speaker is not sure how many, but is sure it is no less than 3. Read-
ing (130-b), which is probably more prominent, says that the minimal
needs of John are satisfied with 3 martinis (though more might be bet-
ter).
The corresponding formulations are as follows:
(131) a. ∀n(GRANT(need(j, |M ∩λx .have(j, x)|= n))→ n≥ 3)
b. need(j,∀n(GRANT(|M ∩λx .have(j, x)|= n)→ n≥ 3))
Geurts and Nouwen account for the first reading in a straightfor-
ward, compositional way. In order to get the second, more prominent
reading, they propose a mechanism of modal concord: the epistemic
modal of at least becomes deontic as a consequence of the explicit re-
quirement indicated by need. In contrast, we account for the two read-
ings of (129) as a straightforward case of scope ambiguity, without the
need to posit any additional devices.
Note that in order to obtain the reading in (130-b), we are treating
the verb need as a sort of meta-speech act. Specifically, the verb must
be able to subcategorize for speech acts, i.e. the subject must be an
entity that is capable of GRANTing (typically a human). Indeed, with
an inanimate subject, this reading is not available:
(132) The project needs at least three years to complete.
Sentence (132) can only get the reading corresponding to (130-a),
namely that the speaker denies that the project will be completed in
less than three years (but is not sure how long it will actually take).
Crucially, it does not receive the reading corresponding to (130-b),
where three years will definitely be enough to provide whatever is
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necessary for the project to finish (though more time may perhaps be
better).
Of course, the formulations in (131) are not complete, so long as we
do not provide an analysis of the relation need. In fact, we argue that,
together with such an appropriate definition, our approach provides
the way to solve a difficult puzzle involving the meaning of expressions
of requirements. Consider the following sentence:
(133) John needs to have a drink in order to go to sleep.
On the face of it, this sentence expresses a necessary and sufficient
condition for John’s going to sleep: if he has a drink he will fall asleep,
and if he doesn’t—he won’t. But von Fintel and Iatridou (2005) point
out that the condition, although necessary, is not sufficient: in order to
go to sleep John also needs not to be working, to have a place to sleep
on, to breathe, etc.
There are, however, two problems with the view that sentences
like (129) express only necessary conditions. One problem is that ev-
ery entailment of a necessary condition is also a necessary condition:
for example, having a drink entails being alive. Now, although, upon
reflection, most people will agree that John needs to be alive in order
to sleep, (134) certainly does not sound very natural (cf. von Stechow
et al. 2005).
(134) John needs to be alive in order to go to sleep.
Nouwen (2009) points out another problem, which is the following. If
requirements are necessary conditions, (135-a) would entail (135-b),
which would entail (135-c). From these, (136) would follow, but,
again, this sounds wrong.
(135) a. John needs three martinis to fall asleep.
b. John needs two martinis to fall asleep.
c. John needs one martini to fall asleep.
(136) The minimal number of martinis that John needs to fall asleep
is 1.
If a sentence is true yet sounds funny, this is often indicative of an
ambiguity: under one reading it is true, but under another, it is odd.
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Perhaps this is the case with (134); this suggests an alternative way to
interpret von Fintel and Iatridou’s observation.
We maintain that requirements are, in fact, necessary and sufficient
conditions. But we suggest that statements of requirements contain
an implicit at least. Verbs like need33 subcategorize for a nominal ex-
pression (DP) that expresses a minimal requirement that can be made
explicit with at least.
Some evidence for this comes from examples such as (137-a), which
can only mean that the number n such that you need at least n good
deeds to go to heaven is n ≤ 3. In contrast, (137-b) has a perverse
reading saying that if you did more than three good deeds you won’t
go to Heaven.
(137) a. You need at most three good deeds to go to Heaven.
b. You need to have done at most three good deeds to go
to Heaven.
Assuming an implicit at least in the representation of requirements,
the result is ambiguous, depending on whether this superlative quan-
tifier takes scope above or below the modal. Thus, (135-a) actually
means (138), which is ambiguous between (139-a) and (139-b), with
the latter being clearly the dominant reading.
(138) John needs at least three martinis (to fall sleep).
(139) a. The set of necessary and sufficient conditions for John’s
falling asleep includes at least the condition of having
three martinis (i.e. the conjunction of the necessary and
sufficient conditions entails having three martinis).
b. The necessary and sufficient condition for John’s falling
asleep is that he has at least three martinis
This ambiguity falls out of the formulations in (131), if the order
‘≥’ is generalized to entailment, as discussed in section 3.3 above. We
formulate (139-a) and (139-b), respectively, as (140-a) and (140-b)
(ignoring issues of modality):
(140) a. ∀P(GRANT(sleep(j)↔ P)→ P ≥ ˆ|M ∩λx .have(j, x)
| ≥ 3)
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b. sleep( j)↔∀P(GRANT(P)→ P ≥ ˆ|M ∩λx .have(j, x)|
≥ 3)
The formulation in (140-a) means that if the speaker GRANTs that
P is a necessary and sufficient condition for John’s sleeping, then P
is greater than or equal to (i.e., entails) the condition that John have
three martinis or more. In other words, the speaker knows that the set
of necessary and sufficient conditions for John’s falling asleep includes
at least having three martinis.
The formulation in (12b) means that it is a necessary and sufficient
condition for John’s falling asleep that any statement that the speaker
GRANTs (contextually restricted to statements about the number of
martinis John has) is that John had a number of martinis that is greater
than or equal to 3.
Note that (140-a) entails (134): if a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for John’s falling asleep entails having three martinis or more, and
having three martinis or more entails breathing, then a necessary and
sufficient condition for John’s falling asleep entails breathing. How-
ever, (140-b) does not entail (134): if having at least three martinis
is a necessary and sufficient condition for John’s falling asleep, it does
not follow that breathing is also a necessary and sufficient condition for
John’s falling asleep. We believe this is why most people would agree
that (134) follows, but feel uncomfortable with this conclusion.
Similarly, (135-b) only follows from (140-a), but not (140-b). It
follows from (140-a), for if the necessary and sufficient condition for
John’s falling asleep entails having three martinis or more, it entails
having two martinis or more. But (135-b) does not follow under read-
ing (140-b), for if having at least three martinis is necessary and suf-
ficient for falling asleep, it does not follow that having at least two
martinis is necessary and sufficient for John’s falling asleep.
Therefore, (136) only follows under the following reading: the
minimal number n s.t. the set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for John’s falling asleep entails having n martinis is 1. But since this




6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we have argued that superlative quantifiers are quanti-
fiers over meta-speech acts, and developed a framework for modeling
speech acts and meta-speech acts. In this framework, GRANTing a
proposition is the denegation of asserting its negation. This framework
also provides a natural analysis of conjunction and, to some extent,
disjunction of speech acts.
We have proposed that at least 3 φ means that the minimal number
n s.t. the speaker GRANTs φ(n) is 3. And at most 3 φ means that the
maximal number n s.t. the speaker GRANTs φ(n) is 3.
Furthermore, we argue that the falsity of a superlative quantifier is
determined semantically, but its truth is determined pragmatically, via
scalar implicature. Hence, superlative quantifiers can be embedded in
environments where scalar implicature survives.
We have shown how this theory explains the facts concerning the
distribution and interpretation of superlative quantifiers better than
competing approaches, while maintaining correct, objective truth con-
ditions.
If this account is on the right track, it has significant implications
that go beyond an account of a particular linguistic phenomenon. We
have argued that interlocutors often express meta-speech acts: they
are not moves in the conversation, but indicate which moves are pos-
sible. Moreover, we have demonstrated that speech acts (including
meta-speech acts) can be modeled as changes of commitment spaces.
Thus they become semantic objects, and hence part of semantic recur-
sion, although they do not have truth conditions. Therefore they can
be embedded, provided their embedding is interpretable.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are both deeply thankful to Barbara Partee for extremely helpful
comments on an earlier version of this paper.
A. C. acknowledges support of the Israel Science Foundation, Grant
# 376/09. M. K. acknowledges support by Bundesministerium für Bil-
dung und Forschung (BMBF) (Grant # 01UG0711).
Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models
53 Ariel Cohen & Manfred Krifka
Notes
1There is another reading of (1-a) (Horn 1972; Kadmon 1987), which can be made
the preferred interpretation by focus, where John petted exactly three rabbits, and
maybe other animals as well. The two readings behave differently, e.g., with respect
to anaphora; but we defer discussion of this reading until section 3.3.
2Geurts & Nouwen (2007) point out additional cases where the distribution of su-
perlative quantifiers is more restricted than that of comparative quantifiers; we will dis-
cuss such cases when we deal with embedded superlative quantifiers in section 5 below.
3Incidentally, the meaning of (1-b) is different from that of (i), since only the latter
implicates that John petted no more than two rabbits.
(i) John petted two rabbits.







some bats and small rodents have ever been in this cave
Non-numerical scales will be discussed in section 3.3.
5See Roelofsen & van Gool (2009) for more on the interpretations of disjunctive ques-
tions, and how they are affected by intonation.
6We thank Barbara Partee for this modification of our original example.
7The name we chose for this speech act is of course meant to be suggestive, but we
are definitely not claiming that the English verb grant denotes the speech act GRANT.














17ˆφ indicates the intension of φ.
18cf. Brasoveanu (2009) who proposes that the infelicity of superlative quantifiers in
such cases is pragmatic, rather than semantic. For him, however, this does not follow






23Though not, perhaps, for values of n that are much greater than 3.
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24As Bolinger (1978) points out, these negative questions actually have another read-
ing, where PPIs are not licensed; under this reading, the speaker is seeking confirmation
for the propositions that it is not cold, that the hearer is not tired, and that he does not
have much money, respectively.
25The other two are scalar, which is roughly the sense we have been dealing with so
far in this paper, and rhetorical retreat, which is exemplified by:
(i)
a. Mary is at home—at least John’s car is in the driveway.
b. Mary is at home—at least I think so.
c. Mary is at home—at least that’s what Sue said.
d. Mary will help me—at least on the first draft, if it doesn’t rain, when I’ve finished the
outline,...
26We are thankful to Barbara Partee for drawing our attention to this paper.








30Note that think is a bridge verb, allowing for wh-movement from its complement,
and hence for wide-scope construal of scope-bearing elements.
31See Coniglio (2011) for such shifts of speaker-oriented expressions in German.
32Here, and in the following section, we will only use intuitive formulations, leaving
complete formalizations in terms of changes of commitment spaces for another occasion.
33We leave open the question of which, exactly, these verbs are.
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